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THE DEFENCE OF SUPERIOR ORDERS, MANIFEST 
ILLEGALITY PRINCIPLE AND THE STATUTE OF 
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
Abdul Ghafur Hamid @ Khin Maung Sein 
The defence of superior orders has a long and controversial history. Once it was 
thought that only superiors who gave the illegal orders should be liable and soldiers 
should be absolutely free from liability. But such an approach has rarely been 
approved by national and international courts. The Nuremberg Charter, followed 
by the statutes of the ad hoc international criminal tribunals adopted four decades 
later, affirms absolute liability theory and denies superior orders as a defence 
though it can be a mitigating factor. On the other hand, the Rome Statute 
establishing the International Criminal Court recognizes limited liability approach 
and accepts superior orders as a defence if the soldier did not know that the order 
was illegal and it was not manifestly illegal (manifest illegality principle). The 
present paper casts doubt on the argument that the manifest illegality principle 
as enshrined in the Rome Statute is contrary to customary international law. 
The paper argues that the absolute liability principle as adopted by the Nuremberg 
Charter do not reflect customary international law of the time because State 
practice is divided and decisions of domestic courts in most countries are not in 
favour of it. The paper concludes that in corporation of 'manifest illegality principle 
in a multilateral treaty like the Rome Statute has the potential of generating the 
principle to be a rule of customary international law in future. 
INTRODUCTION 
International criminal law has borrowed extensively from 
domestic criminal law, in particular in its infancy. However, due 
the the desirability of impunity for horrendous crimes that shock 
the international community, international criminal law has 
rapidly developed into a full-fledged specialized subject of 
international law. Very much similar to domestic criminal law, 
* LL.B. (Yangon), LL.M. in International Law (Yangon), Ph.D. (IIUM), Professor 
of Law and Coordinator of the International Law and Maritime Affairs (ILMA) 
Research Unit of the International Islamic University Malaysia 
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certain defences are available to the defendants in international 
criminal proceedings.1 Among the factors that preclude 
international criminal liability, 'defence of superior orders' is quite 
controversial and widely debated. 
According to military discipline and under military law a 
soldier is bound to obey the orders of his superiors without 
hesitation and without any question. At the same time, it is quite 
possible that some orders will be illegal and will be a crime under 
either domestic law or international law. In such cases, the soldier's 
duty to obey will clash with his duty not to commit a criminal act. 
He is therefore placed in a very difficult position and caught on 
the horns of a dilemma. The crucial question is whether he should 
be exempted from criminal liability even though what he did 
amounts to a heinous crime. 
The present paper traces the history of the defence of superior 
orders and identifies the three main approaches, namely: (1) the 
notion of absolute defence or respondeat superior; (2) the notion of 
absolute liability; and (3) the concept of limited liability for following 
manifestly illegal order. The paper finds that neither of the first 
two approaches deals with the soldier's dilemma well and they 
both fail to give a practical solution to the problem. The absolute 
defence approach has rarely been approved by national or 
international courts and the absolute liability approach is 
inconsistent with the demands of military discipline. The paper 
suggests that the limited liability approach or the 'manifest illegality 
principle', which aims at adjusting the conflicting demands of 
military discipline and the supremacy of the law, is the correct 
solution to the dilemma. 
Although the Nuremberg Charter and the statutes establishing 
ad hoc international criminal tribunals stick to the absolute liability 
approach, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
incorporates the limited liability approach (manifest illegality 
principle) in its Article 33. The present paper concludes that such 
incorporation in a multilateral treaty like the Rome Statute has 
the potential of generating this principle to be a rule of customary 
international law in future. 
II. THE THREE MAIN APPROACHES TO THE DEFENCE OF 
SUPERIOR ORDERS 
The issue of pleading superior order as a defence has been a 
particularly controversial and debatable one and there has been a • 
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lack of consistency regarding its applicability under international 
law. One of the reasons why the defence causes problems is that 
it demonstrates a tension between national and international law. 
That is, while soldiers have a legal obligation under national law 
to obey superior orders without ever questioning them, they also 
have a corresponding legal obligation under international law to 
refuse to commit international crimes. Therefore, soldiers can often 
be placed in an extremely awkward dilemma. The intensity of the 
dilemma can clearly be seen in the following remarks: "The soldier 
who refuses to obey an order which is legal from the standpoint 
of national law may well find himself before a firing squad after 
being court martialled by his own state"2 
If we look into the history of the defence of superior 
orders, we can clearly find that the legal thinking has been 
developed into three main approaches: (1) the notion of absolute 
defence or respondeat superior; (2) the notion of absolute liability; and 
(3) the concept of limited liability for following manifestly illegal 
orders. 
(A) Absolute Defence Approach: Respondeat Superior 
Professor Oppenheim was the staunchest supporter of the idea of 
absolute defence of superior orders. This approach is also known 
as the doctrine of respondeat superior. According to this doctrine, a 
soldier who commits an offence whilst following an order should 
be entirely exempted from responsibility and it is the superior 
who has to take all the blame for issuing an illegal order.3 The 
rationale behind this approach of course is the utmost upholding 
of military discipline. There are, however, some shortcomings in 
this approach. It, for example, fails to assign responsibility in cases 
where the soldier is aware of the illegality of the order, but 
nevertheless agrees with it.4 It favors the principle of military 
efficiency to the complete neglect of personal criminal 
accountability. Fortunately, absolute defence approach has rarely 
been approved by national and international courts.5 
However, the unprecedented brutality of World War I gave 
rise to an opposite theory of 'absolute liability' in which individual 
combatants who commit atrocities should be tried for their crimes 
without having any recourse whatsoever to the defence of superior 
orders. 
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(B) Absolute Liability Approach 
This approach absolutely prohibits the defence of superior orders. 
Obedience to superior orders may only serve as a mitigating factor 
for sentencing purposes. According to this doctrine, soldiers are 
not required to obey illegal orders. It is, therefore, diametrically 
opposed to the absolute defence because its main purpose is to 
safeguard the supremacy of the law, at the expense of military 
discipline, ignoring that a successful military is built on a 
foundation of discipline that demands "total and unqualified 
obedience [to orders] without any hesitation or doubt."6 The 
absolute liability approach asserts that soldiers are legally bound 
to follow only lawful orders. Thus, it denies that obedience to 
superior orders creates a defense per se when a soldier follows an 
illegal order.7 
This absolute liability approach requires the subordinate to 
scrutinize and understand the practical and legal implications of 
all his superior's orders. If the subordinate determines the orders 
are illegal, he must refuse to follow them. Otherwise, the 
subordinate assumes responsibility for the consequences of his or 
her actions. The main weakness of this approach is that it is entirely 
based on the false assumption that the legality of an order is easily 
discernable to the subordinate. There will be situations where the 
impropriety of an order is not clear, especially to a subordinate 
who does not have the same access to material information as his 
superior. A high-ranking U.S. Army officer recently commented 
that "I know that if I ever go to war again, the first person I'm 
taking is my lawyer"'8 This suggests that even high ranking 
commanders have difficulty discerning all the legal implications 
of wartime acts and the difficulty is only amplified at lower levels 
where subordinates have less access to the intelligence and overall 
command strategy upon which their orders are based. 
Another weakness of the absolute liability approach is that it 
fails to address the dilemma of how to promote military discipline 
while maintaining the supremacy of the law.9 Under such a strict 
liability regime, it is likely that hesitation in carrying out orders 
will increase, there will be more instances of insubordination, and 
in volunteer armed forces, recruiting may be adversely affected. 
Indeed, as soldiers begin questioning every order, military 
preparedness erodes, which has devastating effects for a nation's 
security. This is the main reason why national laws and military 
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manuals in most of the countries do not acknowledge the absolute 
liability approach. 
It was with the Nuremberg Charter that the absolute liability 
approach gained international recognition and approval. 
However, the Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters are seen by many 
as somewhat of an overreaction by the Allied Powers to the horrific 
events that took place during the war. It is for that reason that 
many scholars now question the legitimacy of the two Charters, 
as well as the trials, as valid precedents in the context of the 
superior orders defence.10 
(C) Limited Liability Approach: Liability for Manifestly Illegal 
Orders (Manifest illegality principle) 
Neither of the two approaches stated above deals with the soldier's 
dilemma well. They both fail in practical application. The absolute 
defence approach is not in accord with national or international 
law and the absolute liability approach is inconsistent with the 
demands of military discipline. As a result, courts have developed 
a compromise whereby a soldier may rely on the superior orders 
defence in the event of an order which is manifestly illegal. This 
solution is usually referred to as the "manifest illegality principle" 
and is aimed at adjusting the conflicting demands of military 
discipline and the supremacy of the law. 
The doctrines of 'respondeat superior' and 'absolute liability' 
represent two polar extreme positions towards an issue that, in 
fact, requires a much more nuanced approach. Such a nuanced, 
'middle-of-the-road' approach first appeared in the very beginning 
of the 20th century in the case of Regina v. Smith.11 Smith was a 
soldier who, acting on the orders of his superior during the Boer 
War, killed a native. Solomon J held that: 
It is monstrous to suppose that a soldier would be protected where 
the order is grossly illegal... I think it is a safe rule to lay down that 
if a soldier honestly believes that he is doing his duty in obeying the 
command of his superior, and if the orders are not so manifestly illegal 
that he must or ought to have known that they were unlawful, the 
private soldier would be protected by the orders of his superior.12 
This judgment marks the introduction of what is known as the 
'manifest illegality principle' whereby, for the defence to succeed, 
the accused must demonstrate (1) absence of subjective knowledge 
of the illegality of the order and (2) that the order was not 
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'manifestly illegal' in the objective sense that a reasonable person 
in the same position would not have known the order to be illegal. 
However, this approach of superior orders did not gain real 
prominence until the Leipzig Trials following World War I. In the 
Llandovery Castle Case,13 in which the accused had torpedoed a 
British hospital ship under superior orders, the court stated: 
It is certainly to be urged in favor of the military subordinates that 
they are under no obligation to question the order of their superior 
officer, and they can count upon its legality. But no such confidence 
can be held to exist, if such an order is universally known to 
everybody, including the accused, to be without any doubt whatever 
against the law.14 
The limited defense of superior orders or the 'manifest illegality 
principle' is a compromise that balances the competing aims by 
promoting discipline in the military while not entirely subverting 
the supremacy of the law.15 The principle has a number of merits. 
First of all, it allows the subordinate to presume that his orders 
are legal, and obedience to those orders is a defense unless the 
illegality of the orders is obvious to any person of ordinary 
understanding.16 The presumption that orders are legal helps 
maintain and promote good order and discipline. Since 
subordinates do not risk incurring liability in most situations, the 
presumption effectively compensates for the subordinate's lack 
of information and eliminates the possibility of hesitation and 
delay in carrying out orders. Thus, the defense of obedience 
maintains the supremacy of the law by assigning culpability where 
"moral choice" was in fact possible.17 Indeed the defense holds 
commanders responsible for their orders, rather than subordinates. 
Assigning the superior presumptive knowledge of the law, 
and thus liability under the law, should create an incentive for 
the superior to learn the law and a disincentive to deliver illegal 
orders. While the defendant can raise the defense in this situation, 
a prosecutor can attempt to prove that the subordinate did know 
the law. Just as a subordinate may argue that he subjectively 
believed an illegal order he obeyed was lawful, the prosecution 
.may introduce evidence about a defendant's subjective knowledge 
to demonstrate that he in fact knew the illegality of the order. If 
the prosecutor succeeds in establishing that the subordinate knew 
his order was illegal, but followed the order nonetheless, the 
defense will not succeed in negating the mens rea element of the 
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criminal act. It is even possible that a court-martial or military 
commission could determine that the order was manifestly illegal 
to a reasonable person in the defendant's subjective situation. It 
thus seems likely that the defendant who knowingly follows an 
illegal order will be subject to criminal liability. 
The supremacy of the law is upheld with the manifest illegality 
defense of superior orders, because the defense serves to establish 
that the defendant does not possess the mens rea required for the 
criminal act for which he is charged. Thus the manifest illegality 
principle results in a defense, which guides jurists between the 
conflicting demands of military discipline and the supremacy of 
the law. The defense promotes military discipline while 
maintaining the supremacy of the law by focusing on those with 
the requisite mens rea. 
III. 'MANIFEST ILLEGALITY PRINCIPLE'AS ILLUSTRATED 
BY THE DECISIONS OF DOMESTIC COURTS 
According to the "manifest illegality principle" military orders must 
be obeyed unless they are manifestly unlawful. The crucial 
question here is: what is meant by 'manifest illegality"7.18 The nature 
and meaning of the 'manifest illegality principle,' can be gathered 
from the following leading decisions decided by courts of various 
countries. 
A leading case in English legal history is that of Regina v. 
Smith.19 During the Boer War a patrol of British soldiers, sent out 
on a dangerous mission, had an argument with a native who 
hesitated to find a bridle for them. Smith, one of the soldiers, under 
orders of his superiors, killed the native on the spot. After the 
war, a special court tried Smith for murder and acquitted him. 
The court said, "I think it is a safe rule to lay down that if a soldier 
believes he is doing his duty in obeying commands of his superior, 
and if the orders are not so manifestly illegal that he must or ought to 
have known they were unlawful, the private soldier would be 
protected by the orders of his superior officer." 
In Llandovery Castle Case,20 the soldiers, following the orders 
of their U-boat commander, not only sank the hospital ship but 
also machine-gunned the survivors in the water. The German 
Supreme Court held: 
However, the subordinate obeying an order is liable to punishment, 
if it was known to him that the order of the superior involved the 
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infringement of civil or military law... if such an order is universally 
known to everybody, including the accused, to be without any doubt 
whatsoever against the law. As naval officers by profession [the 
accused] were well aware... that one is not legally authorized to kill 
defenceless people... They should therefore be refused to obey.21 
In Border Guards Prosecution Case,22 two former German Democratic 
Republic (East Germany) border guards were convicted of 
unlawful homicide by a Regional Court of the Federal Republic 
of Germany. The two shot and killed S, a twenty year old citizen 
of the GDR as he ascended a ladder and placed his hand on the 
top of a wall separating East from West Berlin. The two guards 
were under orders to prevent escape and, if necessary, to kill 
escapees.23 The admonition regularly repeated to guards was that 
"in no event are breaches of the border to be permitted. A person 
violating the border is to be caught or destroyed."'24 
The Supreme Court noted that the defense of superior orders 
under East German law was inapplicable in those instances in 
which the command "represents a manifestly gross violation of 
fundamental concepts of justice and humanity." East as well as West 
Germany had acceded to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights. In the view of the Supreme Court, East Germany's 
harsh policy towards escapees contravened the Covenant's 
provisions pertaining to freedom of movement across borders and 
the arbitrary deprivation of life.25 The Court determined that the 
defendants were guilty of unlawful homicide while acting under 
orders.26 The fact that the defendants were not aware of the manifestly 
illegal nature of the order was not controlling.27 
In US v Kinder,28 the defendant, Thomas Kinder, was convicted 
of killing a captured Korean civilian who was not violent or 
attempting to escape. Kinder argued that he was ordered to kill 
so as to scare other locals and to boost troop morale.29 Kinder 
further conceded that he knew the order was illegal. He was 
convicted and it was held that no defence if the crime is a result of 
an order manifestly unlawful and no reasonable doubt could exist on the 
part of a man of ordinary sense and understanding.30 
My Lai Massacre: The ruling in US v Kinder was followed in 
the famous case of US v Calley.31 In 1968, Lieutenant Calley's 
platoon swept through the village of My Lai, shooting at 
everything that moved. The civilians were rounded up and 
murdered in cold blood. The estimated number of dead 
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Vietnamese was 347.32 At trial, Calley argued that he lacked mens 
rea because he acted in accordance with orders issued by Captain 
Ernest Medina. It was proven that no such order was given. In 
any event, the Court held that even if it existed, Calley could not 
rely on the superior orders defence if the jury determined that he 
knew the order was illegal and that a man of ordinary sense and 
understanding would have known the orders to be unlawful. 
The most prominent Israeli case involving superior orders was 
the Eichmann case.33 Eichmann's principal defense was that he was 
trained and obligated to serve as an obedient and unquestioning 
subordinate who was expected to carry out every command, 
regardless of whether the order required repression or murder.34 
The District Court determined that Eichmann knowingly and 
enthusiastically pursued a clearly criminal course of conduct.35 
The Supreme Court judgment contains a particularly useful 
discussion of superior orders.36 
The counsel for the Appellant in the Supreme Court of Israel 
proposed the defense of obedience to superior orders claiming 
that Eichmann took the oath of allegiance when he joined the SS 
and thus Hitler's compulsion to destroy the Jews completely was 
the order he received by his superior. The court rejects such 
contention declaring in particular that "the defense that the act 
was done in obedience to superior orders means., .that the person 
who performed it had no alternative - either by law or virtue of 
the regulations of the disciplinary body (army, etc.) of which he 
was a member-but to carry out the order he received from his 
superior." The Judge stated that the accused acted independently 
and even exceeded the tasks that were assigned to him through 
the official chain of command. 
The court in Eichmann case says that the question whether to 
allow superior order defense depends on the mental state of the 
accused at the time of the offense and in particular whether the 
offender knew about the unlawful nature of the order. The court 
establishes in accordance with the tendency from the English law 
that "such defense is admissible where there was obedience to an order 
not manifestly unlawful." Following the suggested criteria the court 
then declares that the superior orders defense will be rejected for 
the accused because: 
(i) The order for extermination of the Jews was manifestly 
unlawful and contrary to the "basic ideas of law and 
justice", and 
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(ii) The accused was well aware at the time of committing 
his crimes that he was a party to the perpetration of the 
most grave and horrible crimes. 
To prove such knowledge the court cites Eichmann's own 
statements where he himself declares that in the extermination of 
the Jews he sees "one of the gravest crimes in the history of the 
mankind" also admitting that he had such realization when he 
committed the crimes: "I already at that time realized that 
this was something illegal, something terrible..." 
In the Malinki case,37 an Israeli Military Court of Appeal 
affirmed, in part, a district military court's conviction of eight 
policemen charged with killing forty-three Arab residents of Israel. 
These killings arose during a curfew imposed on the village of 
Kafr Qassem.38 The Court of Appeal ruled that an order to kill 
peaceful and innocent citizens who were returning home from 
work on the grounds that this was required to maintain a curfew 
"is an order to commit a crime of murder".39 Israeli law 
significantly recognized that an individual was not criminally 
responsible for an act or omission carried out in accordance with 
a superior's orders unless the command was manifestly unlawful.'40 
The Court observed that the values of discipline and the rule of 
law collided when a soldier was required to obey an illegal order 
and that this "creates an excruciatingly difficult dilemma" for both 
the legislature which was charged with creating standards and 
for the combatant compelled to choose between insubordination 
and contravention of criminal law.41 
The Court noted three possible solutions to this dilemma. The 
imposition of strict liability had the disadvantage of compelling 
subordinates to examine and explore every command and 
undermined order and discipline.42 The recognition of superior 
orders as a justification would insulate every excess from legal 
sanction and limit liability to those in command.43 The preferable 
position recognized the difficulty of reconciling these competing 
considerations and struck an intelligent balance by affirming the 
obligation of soldiers to obey all but manifestly unlawful orders.44 The 
Court noted that the illegal character of these clearly criminal 
commands do not require the subtle and nuanced judgment of 
the trained legal expert.45 This was an objective standard based on the 
perception of a reasonable combatant; the subjective belief of the defendant 
as well as the belief of other witnesses as to the legality of an order is not 
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strictly relevant.46 In applying this test, a court should consider 
evidence concerning the circumstances under which a defendant 
carried out an order, including his knowledge, beliefs, and honest 
and reasonable mistakes which might have influenced his 
behavior.47 
The case of Malinki contributed to the jurisprudence of 
obedience to superior orders by clarifying that the manifest illegality 
of an order was to be evaluated in light of the reactions of a reasonable 
person under the circumstances and context of the command. 
In the Canadian case of Regina v Finta,48 Finta served as a 
captain in the Royal Hungarian Gendarmerie and was posted to 
Szeged by the Nazi controlled regime.49 Finta was charged with 
carrying out the so-called "Baky Order" and allegedly supervised 
the deportation of 8,617 Hungarian Jews to Auschwitz where they 
were subjected to forced labor and extermination. Finta eventually 
emigrated to Canada where he was charged and acquitted of 
crimes against humanity and war crimes.50 
The Supreme Court recognized that military organizations 
depend upon immediate, instantaneous and unhesitating obedience 
to superior orders.51 This has "through the centuries led to the 
concept that acts done in obedience to military orders will exonerate 
those who carry them out."52 Judge Peter Cory, however, noted that 
this rule has been disregarded in the case of manifestly illegal orders.53 
These are commands which offend the conscience of "any reasonable, right-
thinking person; it is an order which is obviously and flagrantly wrong."54 
The order cannot be in a "grey area or be merely questionable; rather it 
must patently and obviously be wrong."55 
The following conclusions can be drawn from the above 
discussions. First, although knowledge of the accused is taken into 
consideration by some courts, the jurisprudence of the 
overwhelming majority of courts is that if an order is manifestly 
illegal, the defence is not available even though the accused does 
not know about the illegality of the order. Secondly, whether an 
order is manifestly illegal or not is to be determined objectively. A 
manifestly illegal order is an order which is obviously and 
flagrantly wrong. It must be a gross violation of fundamental 
concepts of justice and humanity. The test is that of a 'reasonable 
man'. The manifest illegality of an order is to be evaluated in light 
of the reactions of any reasonable or right-thinking person under the 
circumstances and context of the order. 
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IV. IS THERE AN ESTABLISHED RULE OF CUSTOMARY 
INTERNATIONAL LAW ON THE DEFENCE OF 
SUPERIOR ORDERS? 
Before the World War I, the weight of scholarly opinion was in 
favour of the 'absolute defence' approach and English, French and 
American law insulated a subordinate officer who acted in 
accordance with superior orders from criminal prosecution. The 
leading treatise on international law authored by Professor 
Oppenheim pronounced to that effect.56 Article 443 of the British 
Manual of Military Law on superior orders of 1914, drafted by 
Oppenheim, followed the same idea. Article 443 further provided 
that individuals issuing illegal orders (superiors) were subject to 
criminal punishment.57 This provision was adopted, with only 
slight modification, as Article 336 of the Rules of Land Warfare 
approved by the United States Army and issued in April 1914.58 
However, judicial decisions rarely approved the absolute defence 
approach and as illustrated by the early common law case of Regina 
v Smith59 decided in 1900, Courts generally preferred the limited 
defence or 'manifest illegality' principle. 
The Period between World War I and World War II 
The unprecedented brutality of World War I gave rise to the 
'absolute liability' theory. This theory squarely opposes the 'absolute 
defence' approach and denies superior orders as a defence. Thus, 
the period between World War I and World War II witnessed 
competing perspectives on the superior orders defense. 
The Penal Senate of the German Supreme Court at Leipzig in 
Dover Castle held that a subordinate generally was not culpable 
for carrying out a superior order. The subordinate was liable in 
only those instances in which he or she went beyond the 
parameters of the order or carried out a command which he was 
aware contravened civil or criminal law.60 
In Llandovery Castle, The Penal Senate stressed that a superior 
officer issuing an order violative of international law was solely 
responsible.61 A combatant obeying such an order only was liable 
"if it was known to him that the order of superior involved an 
infringement of civil or military law." The subordinate may 
assume that a superior order is consistent with international 
standards and is not obliged to question a facially legal command. 
Subordinates, however, may incur liability in those instances in 
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which "an order is universally known to everybody ... to be 
without any doubt whatever against the law." The Penal Senate 
stressed that the order to fire at defenseless individuals in lifeboats 
was one of those "rare" and "exceptional" instances in which it 
was perfectly clear that an order constituted a breach of the law. 
The command was "universally known" to be contrary to the law 
of nations. The defendants, as professional naval officers, were 
well-aware of the relevant law and were obligated to refuse to 
carry out the command.62 
These German decisions appeared to balance the desirability 
of military discipline with recognition that subordinates possessed 
the responsibility to resist clearly and conspicuously illegal 
demands and directives. The conclusion then is that before the 
World War I, the prevailing view on the defence of superior orders 
was that of the absolute defence and that the practice of domestic 
courts before and after the World War I inclined more on the 
'manifest illegality' principle. Schabas even went so far as to say 
that prior to World War II, customary international law held that 
a crime committed as a result of superior orders was excusable to 
the extent that it fell under the rubric of the 'manifestly illegal' 
principle.63 
The World War II and the Nuremberg Charter 
During the World War II, the Allies learned of the atrocities being 
committed by the Nazis and realized that they could not continue 
to support the absolute defence if they were going to deny it to 
prospective German defendants in the upcoming trials. In 1944, 
both the American and British armies modified their respective 
war manuals. Other countries followed this trend and introduced 
similar legislation-all in order to ensure that no potential 
defendant would be able to avoid responsibility by arguing that 
he was acting under superior orders. 
The Charter of the International Military Tribunal at 
Nuremberg, after extensive negotiations, came into being in 1945. 
The superior orders defence was addressed in Article 8, which 
provides: 
The fact that the Defendant acted pursuant to order of his 
Government or of a superior shall not free him from responsibility, 
but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal 
determines that justice so requires." 
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The Article in effect abrogated the defence completely and thus 
imposing 'absolute liability'. Accordingly, no prospective defendant 
could be exempted from responsibility on the basis of obedience 
to orders.64 In fact, the Allies were fully aware of the fact that, 
from 1906 to 1945, obedience to superior orders was an absolute 
defence in several countries. However, for fear of the fact that the 
recognition of an absolute defence approach would have led to 
acquittals rather than convictions, the Allies went from one 
extreme to another. That is the reason why some scholars argue 
that the defence of obedience to superior orders was not abolished 
as a result of the Nuremberg trials but merely excluded due to 
very unusual circumstances of the aftermath of the World War II. 
In other words, there was no shift in international legal doctrine 
after the Nuremberg trials.65 
The Nuremberg Charter restricts the use of "superior orders" 
to mitigating punishment only in instances where justice so 
requires.66 In trials before the tribunal, defence counsel repeatedly 
asserted that their clients were following orders, and they did not 
confine such assertions to the mitigation of punishment. Thus, 
lawyers for Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel and Colonel General 
Alfred Jodl argued that the defendants were following orders and 
thus not only should have mitigated punishment but also should 
have no criminal liability.67 The tribunal explicitly rejected all of 
these claims and announced that the law of all nations rejected a 
defence based on superior orders to kill or torture in violation of 
international law.68 Some judges at Nuremberg wanted to go 
further. They urged holding defendants responsible unless they 
lacked a "moral choice"—a personal capacity to act differently 
without risking one's own life or the safety of one's family.69 This 
concept in contemporary terms has more in common with the 
defence of duress, and indeed, duress has sometimes been 
confused with the defence of superior orders.70 
Yet, after the Nuremberg trials, diplomatic efforts to establish 
a permanent international criminal court and to codify the 
rejection of the superior orders defence failed as Western powers 
and the Soviet Union approached each negotiation in light of 
Cold War tensions.71 Despite long meetings with expert 
committees, the United Nations could not secure agreement on 
proposed codifications of the laws of war, peace, and security; 
efforts to formulate principles from Nuremberg failed.72 Nor 
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could the International Red Cross summon sufficient support to 
include the superior orders provision in the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions or the 1977 Additional Protocols.73 National 
representatives disagreed over whether soldiers should ever be 
expected to think for themselves and decide whether or not to 
obey orders.74 
Some experts conclude that this failure by any international 
group to adopt a formal statement rejecting the defence of superior 
orders means that the defence is now available.75 One scholar 
argues that because international law has not clearly rejected the 
superior orders defence, defence counsel in war crimes trials who 
do not assert a defence of superior orders would be "professionally 
derelict"'76 Others emphasize that even the Nuremberg 
formulation preserved the defence in connection with coercion or 
lack of moral choice, or in limited circumstances.77 
Most experts, in contrast, emphasize that even though efforts 
to codify the rejection of the superior orders defence failed, 
developing international law eliminates the defence in the case of 
orders that are manifestly illegal.78 This leaves the defence available 
to soldiers who can show that the orders they followed were not 
clearly and obviously illegal. 
We can draw two conclusions from the above discussions. 
First, the approach of the Nuremberg Charter on the defence of 
superior orders did not have the effect of codifying the pre-existing 
customary international law because from 1906 to 1945 obedience 
to superior orders was an absolute defence in several countries. 
Second, the approach of the Charter has not crystallized or 
generated a new customary international law because State 
practice is divided and decisions of domestic courts in most 
countries are not in favour of the absolute liability theory. 
The Impact of the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals 
Four decades later, the United Nations Security Council followed 
the Nuremberg Tribunal's rejection of superior orders when it 
authorized the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia ("ICTY").79 Article 7(4) of the ICTY Statute 
directly mirrored Article 8 of the Nuremberg Charter in entirely 
excluding superior orders as a full defence. It reads: "The fact that 
an accused person acted pursuant to an order of a government or 
of a superior shall not relieve him or her of criminal responsibility, 
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but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal 
determines that justice so requires." 
The United Nations authorizations for the ad hoc International 
Criminal Tribunal far Rwanda (ICTR) and the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone each omit superior orders as a defence but permit the use of 
superior orders to mitigate punishment.80 After some initial 
ambiguity, the Special Panels to hear Serious Crimes in East Timor81 
and the Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal, signed by the 
administrator of the Coalition Provision Authority also follow the 
lead of the Nuremberg Charter.82 Yet while each uses the same 
approach, denying a defence based on superior orders but 
permitting mitigation if justice so requires, there are complications. 
Superior orders did supply a defence at the time the mass violence 
in East Timor was committed, so the tribunal's elimination of the 
defence raises the danger of punishment under a retroactive law.83 
In addition, an illegal order may still give rise to a defence without 
any assessment of whether it was manifestly illegal.84 
Accordingly,"the jurisprudence of the courts set up after 1945 
to punish war criminals was...strongly leaning towards the 
absolute liability principle.'85 Nevertheless, even at the time of 
the adoption of the ICTY Statute, US Permanent Representative, 
Madeleine Albright, curiously declared the 'manifestly illegal' 
principle to be the guiding standard: "It is, of course, a defence 
that the accused was acting pursuant to orders where he or she 
did not know the orders were unlawful and a person of ordinary 
sense and understanding would not have known the orders to be 
unlawful."86 Seemingly then, Scaliotti is correct in asserting that 
the "answer to the question regarding the rule applicable to 
superior orders under international law before the Rome Statute 
is... far from clear."87 
Furthermore, it is certainly questionable whether strict 
adherence to the Nuremberg standard is appropriate given the 
nature of modern international criminal tribunals. The following 
observation by Rowe is particularly relevant: 
"It is no real answer to argue that the Nuremberg principles will 
supply the answer to the scope of defences under international law. 
The defendants at the International Military Tribunals at Nuremberg 
and Tokyo were the senior directors of war crimes committed by 
others. The Hague Tribunal, by way of contrast, is, for the most part, 
having to deal with the 'small fish' who, in 'armies' with disciplinary 
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systems that would hardly be recognized by senior officers of 
established state armies and with inadequate training were often as 
much victims of their own side as were their enemies." 88 
This conception of the 'small fish' war criminal as 'victim' is an 
interesting one. Surely a military disciplinary system in which a 
superior can, for example, threaten to kill a subordinate and/or 
his or her family for failure to obey an order is one that would 
hardly be recognized by senior officers of established state armies. 
If the accused can be perceived as victimized in this way by the 
military hierarchy to which he or she belongs then perhaps the 
more accommodating manifestly illegal' principle is the more 
appropriate standard. However, the question remains, as in the 
above example/what happens when the order to kill innocent 
human beings is accompanied by a threat to life or limb? The 
psychologically coercive effects are now fundamentally different 
in that the accused no longer merely feels a conflict between 
competing duties under national and international law - instead 
the conflict is between the competing interests of self-preservation 
and protecting the lives of others. The issue no longer becomes 
one of superior orders, but becomes one of duress. 
The International Criminal Court and the 'Manifest Illegality' 
Principle 
The drafters of the Rome Statute establishing the International 
Criminal Court departed from the stand of the other international 
tribunals by permitting the defence where the order, given by a 
superior to a subordinate, was not manifestly unlawful and where 
the soldier did not know the order was unlawful. A soldier charged 
with war crimes - though not genocide or crimes against humanity 
- can defend himself or herself from criminal liability by satisfying 
three conditions: that he or she was legally obligated to follow the 
orders to commit the war crimes, that he or she did not know the 
orders were illegal, and that the orders were not on their face 
manifestly illegal. Some countries that are parties to the ICC have 
already amended their .domestic law to be in accord with the ICC 
approach of superior orders. It can be expected to generate a rule 
of customary international law in future. 
Due to divergence in State practice and differences in the 
approaches of the ICC and other international tribunals, the 
conclusion that can be made for the time being is that no customary 
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international law on the defence of superior orders has been 
established and that no single international norm governing the 
defence of superior orders currently exists. 
V. AN ANALYSIS OF ARTICLE 33 OF THE STATUTE OF THE 
ICC 
In 1994, the International Law Commission adopted a Draft Statute 
for an International Criminal Court and submitted it to the General 
Assembly.89 On 11 December, 1995 the General Assembly 
established the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court to prepare and develop its own draft 
statute, building upon the International Law Commission's text.90 
Finally, the General Assembly convened a diplomatic conference 
in Rome, Italy, from 15 June to 17 July, 1998, for the adoption of a 
convention, in the form of a Statute, to establish a permanent 
international criminal court. The participants at the Rome 
Conference included 160 states, 33 international organisations and 
a group of 236 non-governmental organisations (NGOs). 
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court was 
adopted by the Conference on 17 July, 1998, by a vote of 120 states 
in favour, 7 against and 21 abstentions. While France, the United 
Kingdom and Russia supported the Statute, the United States 
declared publicly that it opposed it. China, Israel, Iraq, Libya, 
Quarter and Yemen joined the United States to form the 7 states 
that voted against the Statute. The Rome Statute entered into force 
on 1 July 2002. As of 18 July 2008, there are 139 signatories and 
108 States Parties to the Rome Statute.91 
The Rome Statute creates the International Criminal Court 
(ICC).92 The jurisdiction of the Court is limited to the most serious 
crimes of concern to the international community as a whole. The 
Court has jurisdiction with respect to the following crimes: 
(a) The crime of genocide; 
(b) Crimes against humanity; 
(c) War crimes; and 
(d) The crime of aggression.93 
(A) Drafting History of Article 33 
During the Rome Conference which drafted the Statute of the ICC, 
two main opposing schools of thought emerged. One school of 
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thought was advocated by the group of like-minded countries, 
particularly Germany, and argued for an 'absolute liability' 
approach to the superior orders. They argued that 'superior orders' 
must never be a defence against criminal responsibility for 
international crimes. It is very clear that this approach strictly 
followed the guidelines of the Nuremberg Charter and the Statutes 
of the ICTY and ICTR. 
On the other hand, there are States, in particular the United 
States, which advocated for the 'manifest illegality approach', 
arguing that a soldier obeying orders of his superiors would not 
be criminally responsible unless he knew the order to be unlawful 
or if the order had been manifestly unlawful. The negotiations 
were quite difficult and finally the Conference drafted the present 
Article 33 as a compromised formula. Article 33 of the Statute of 
the International Criminal Court provides: 
Article 33 
Superior orders and Prescription of Law 
1. The fact that a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has 
been committed by a person pursuant to an order of a 
Government or of a superior, whether a military or civilian, 
shall not relieve that person of criminal responsibility unless: 
(a) The person was under a legal obligation to obey orders 
of the government or the superior in question; 
(b) The person did not know that the order was unlawful; 
and 
(c) The order was not manifestly unlawful. 
2. For the purposes of this article, orders to commit genocide or 
crimes against humanity are manifestly unlawful. 
When we make a careful analysis of Article 33, the very first 
thing we can take note is that the Statute of the ICC acknowledges 
'superior orders' as a defence per se, rather than a sub-category of 
the defence of mistake. Nevertheless, Article 33 clearly states the 
principle that superior orders shall not relieve a person of his or 
her criminal responsibility unless certain specific requirements 
are satisfied. Therefore, we can say that Article 33 upholds the 
general principle of the irrelevance of superior orders. Thus any 
reference to the defence of superior orders under Article 33 would 
constitute an exception and the defence will, therefore, have to be 
interpreted narrowlv in accordance with rules of interpretation. 
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The Meaning of Superior Order 
According to Article 33(1), the superior order must come from 
either a government or a superior. Therefore, the order might have 
emanated from a government, for example, in the form of 
legislation or a regulation that would amount to an international 
crime under the Statute. That is why the heading of Article 33 
reads: 'Superior orders and prescription of law". Alternatively, 
the order might have come from a superior who stands higher in 
the hierarch of the chain of command. 
(B) The Three Requirements for a Lawful Defence of Superior 
Orders 
The general rule under Article 33 is that there is no defence of 
superior orders. Therefore, as an exceptional situation, it is for the 
defendant to prove the existence of the three requirements. These 
requirements are cumulative in the sense that all the three must 
be satisfied in order for the defence to be successful. 
(i) The Offender was under a 'Legal Obligation' to Obey the 
Order 
The first requirement is that the person claiming the defence was 
under a legal obligation to obey the said order. The Statute thereby 
refers back to the domestic legal system within which both the 
superior or the government as the case may be, and the offender 
were acting. The Court will have to appraise the binding effect of 
such orders according to that domestic legal system. 
(ii) The Offender did not know that the order was Unlawful 
An offender may only rely on the defence of superior orders if he 
or she did not know that the order was unlawful. Whether 
unlawful or not depends on whether it is a punishable crime under 
the Statute (whether it is a recognized international crime) or not. 
Therefore, whether the act was a punishable offence under the 
domestic legal system of the offender is not relevant. 
This requirement is a purely subjective test as the main concern 
here is with the accused's actual knowledge. It is a lower 
threshold because it is quite easy for the accused to claim his 
lack of such knowledge. Like any other fact, knowledge on 
the part of the accused can be proved by circumstantial evidence, 
that is, facts from which it may be inferred that the accused 
The Defence of Superior Orders, Manifest Illegality Principle... / 21 
had such knowledge. But this lower threshold is raised by 
the third requirement that the order must not be 'manifestly 
unlawful'. 
(iii) The order was not 'Manifestly Unlawful' 
This is the objective requirement, introduced to limit the scope of 
the purely subjective second requirement. An order must be 
considered to be manifestly unlawful if the illegality was 'obvious 
to a person of ordinary understanding'.94 The question to be asked 
here is whether an ordinary person in the situation of the accused 
would have seen that the order was unlawful. When determining 
the unlawfulness of the order, the domestic legal system is 
irrelevance. The decisive factor is whether the order was manifestly 
unlawful under international law. Therefore, the test is whether 
even a layman (not necessary to be a legal expert) with only a 
basic knowledge of international humanitarian law should have 
considered the action to be unlawful. 
(C) The Defence Not Available to Genocide and Grimes Against 
Humanity 
According to Article 33(2), orders to commit genocide or crimes 
against humanity are considered to be manifestly unlawful and 
therefore, the defence of superior orders is not applicable to these 
cases. In other words, the defence is only applicable to orders to 
commit 'war crimes'. In fact, this provision was inserted in Article 
33 in order to appease those States that advocated absolute liability 
approach and opposed the inclusion of the defence in the Rome 
Statute95 and its main purpose was to limit as far as possible the 
scope of the application of the defence. 
However, many scholars are critical of Article 33(2). It is stated 
in the Commentary to the Rome Statute of the ICC: 
This distinction drawn between war crimes, on one hand, and crimes 
against humanity and genocide on the other, is a novelty of the Rome 
Statute. It is deplorable in the sense that it sets up two different 
standards with regard to, on the one hand, acts of genocide and 
crimes against humanity, and on the other, war crimes. This 
distinction is not based in customary international law, nor does it 
exist in any domestic law.96 
Furthermore, Article 33(2) appears to give a wrong signal that the 
commission of war crimes creates lesser injury to the humanity 
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than acts of genocide or crimes against humanity, which is not 
the case. Because of the distinction made in Article 33(2) people 
might think that victims of war crimes are granted a lesser degree 
of protection than victims of genocide or crimes against humanity. 
(D) The Nexus between Superior orders and Command 
Responsibility 
Apart from Article 33, the Rome Statute contains other provisions 
that are relevant to the superior orders debate. The most relevant 
among them is Article 28 which deals with "command 
responsibility. 
Article 28 
Responsibility of Commanders and other Superiors 
In addition to other grounds of criminal responsibility under this 
Statute for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court 
(a) A military commander or person effectively acting as a 
military commander shall be criminally responsible for crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the Court committed by forces under 
his or her effective command and control, or effective authority 
and control as the case may be, as a result of his or her failure 
to exercise control properly over such forces, where: 
(i) That military commander or person either knew or, 
owing to the circumstances at the time, should have 
known that the forces were committing or about to 
commit such crimes; and 
(ii) That military commander or person failed to take all 
necessary and reasonable measures within his or her 
power to prevent or repress their commission or to submit 
the matter to the competent authorities for investigation 
and prosecution. 
This Article allows for the individual liability of those issuing 
illegal orders. Accordingly, the liability is shared between the 
superior and the soldier97 so that the latter is not made a scapegoat. 
(E) Defence of Superior orders under the Rome Statute: 
Shortcomings and Merits 
The Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court 
is the first ever international convention which codifies the 
principle of superior orders and the first attempt of the 
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international community to formulate the principle in the form of 
treaty law. Although there are other international instruments 
dealing with superior orders, such as the Nuremberg Charter and 
the Statutes of the ICTY and the ICTR, they do not create treaty 
law which is based on the consent of States, but instead they were 
either established by the victorious powers or the Security Council 
of the United Nations, as the case may be. 
One criticism made by Professor Cassese and others is that 
they would prefer a clear confirmation of the absolute liability 
principle as contained in the Nuremberg Charter and later 
affirmed by the Statutes of the ICTY and the ICTR, that is, that 
superior order is no defence, but may be considered in mitigation 
of punishment if justice so requires. In this way, according to them, 
the Rome Statute could have paved the way towards a clear 
customary international standard.98 It is submitted that since the 
Rome Statute was the result of thorough negotiations among the 
participating States it is quite foreseeable that a delicate balance 
had to be struck between the need to punish those committing 
heinous crimes, on the one hand, and the need to protect persons 
who unknowingly commit war crimes, on the other. 
Another criticism is that Article 33 has departed from pre-
existing rules of customary international law because it does not 
abide by the absolute liability principle.99 However, it has been 
shown above that there is no uniform and consistent state practice 
and thus it is very much doubtful that there has already been 
established customary international law on the defence of superior 
orders. One of the merits of the successful codification of the 
defence of superior orders in the Rome Statute is that we can at 
least say that an agreement could finally be reached and that this 
will surely influence the development of customary international 
law in future on this subject. 
Several countries committed to the ICC have already amended 
their domestic law to match the ICC standard on superior orders.100 
If many come to do so, this could change the status of the defence 
in customary international law, i.e. the approach of the ICC could 
well be accepted by the international community. In the meantime, 
without having endorsed the ICC, the United States has indicated 
room for the defence under limited circumstances. Thus, the 
United States Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM) currently permits 
the defence as follows: "It is a defense to any offense that the 
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accused was acting pursuant to orders unless the accused knew 
the orders to be unlawful or a person of ordinary sense and 
understanding would have known the orders to be unlawful."101 
This provision not only permits superior orders as a defence but 
does so when a person of ordinary sense and understanding would 
not realize that the order is unlawful. By pegging the standard to 
the person of ordinary sense and understanding, this version 
extends the defence beyond an objective test of illegality to a 
standard considering ordinary persons' knowledge of the law. 
Moreover, the manual indicates that doubts about the legality of 
an order are to be resolved in favour of its legality.102 
The Canadian version permits the defence except if the order 
was manifestly unlawful to a reasonable soldier under the 
circumstances.103 It adopts a definition of manifest illegality as that 
which is "obviously and flagrantly wrong/'104 Variations over time, 
across nations, and among tribunals render doubtful the assertion 
that the Nuremberg Tribunal rejected the superior orders defence 
as a matter of international law. 
Despite some of the criticism directed against Article 33, it is 
the view of the present writer that the Article is very carefully 
phrased and it reflects a clear proposition of the law in this respect. 
It correctly adopts the manifest illegality approach which can be 
found in much of the case law, both before and after the 
Nuremberg trials. Another advantage is that it is extremely limited 
in its scope as it contains a high threshold that many defendants 
will find very difficult to satisfy. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Article 33 of the Rome Statute correctly adopts the compromised 
formula by means of acknowledging the 'manifest illegality 
principle'. It is the humble opinion of the present writer that this 
approach is more flexible and hence more amenable to justice. 
Moreover, this is the first time that the international community 
has actually reached an agreement with respect to the defence of 
obedience to superior orders. This is in itself a significant advance 
in view of the fact that there is no treaty law dealing with the 
topic. The writer believes that the inclusion of Article 33 in the 
Rome statute will result in long-term benefits to the international 
community. It is hoped that it will also contribute to the 
standardization of national laws and martial laws in respect of 
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the defence of superior orders in various countries of the world. 
Finally it wi l l contribute to the deve lopment of customary 
international law in future. 
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